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Two Awakenings, One Process: Implications from the Sunni
Realignment in Iraq, 2006-2007
Diane Maye
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, USA
There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the sub-state level choose to align
and realign during a state of armed conflict. This research draws upon current literature to provide a
framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This research concludes
that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of
institutional maturity, therefore the critical point in the realignment process for the U.S. military is at a
point between an individual’s realignment and the wider community’s perception of their success.
Keywords: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular warfare
There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the sub-state level choose
to align and realign during a state of armed conflict. The literature on this topic can be divided
into four broad categories: historical literature on the ethno-sectarian violence, international
relations literature on alliances and coalitions, sociological literature on the theories of motiva-
tion, and complexity theories on self-organizing social systems. This article will assess two
realignments that took place in Iraq post-2003 at the sub-state level. While there is an abundance
of literature on the history of the Iraq war, alliances at the international level, coalition politics,
and micro-behavior (at the individual level), there is a gap in the literature on the variables
affecting alignments and alliances in a state of civil war, civil insurrection, or where internal
militant factions challenge state sovereignty. This research draws upon current literature to
provide a framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This
research concludes that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural
constraints only at the point of institutional maturity; therefore the critical point in the realign-
ment process for the U.S. military is at a point between an individual’s realignment and the
wider community’s perception of their success.
ALIGNMENT AND ALLIANCE DEFINED
Alignments and alliances are strategies used by organizations to gain a mutual benefit, or to
maximize utility. In the realm of political science and the study of international relations, the
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standard definition for “alliance” comes from Bruce Russett, who described an alliance as, “a
formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which
they will or will not employ military force” (Russett, 1971, pp. 262–263). The challenge with
this definition is that it does not take into account alliances that take place within a country, or
between factions in a state of civil war or civil insurrection. Nor does it take into account
alliances that take place between countries assisting factions within a particular country.1 For the
purposes of this study, the term “alliance” will not be used in the traditional sense, but rather as a
way to describe a formal security arrangement between previously competing political/military
factions. Likewise, an alignment, for the purposes of this study, is used in the broadest sense to
refer to a formal or informal relationship between two armed political or military factions, for the
purposes of mutual security cooperation and mutual policy coordination on security issues
(Barnett & Levy, 1991; Langer, 1950).
IRAQ’S HISTORY OF ETHNO-SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
There is an abundance of literature on the history of ethno-sectarian violence and sociopolitical
divides in Iraq.2 After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and from its inception as a nation-state in
the 1920s, Iraq has remained an amalgamation of hostile ethnic, national, and religious entities
forced together by the British after World War I. Socially, Iraq is divided into three major ethnic
groups; each is based in different areas within the country. Sunnis dominate areas in the center
and the west of the nation and make up approximately 20% of the population. The Shi’ia reside
primarily in the south and account for nearly 60% of the Iraqi people. The historically oppressed
Kurdish minority lives in the north and accounts for approximately 20% of the population.
Like many Middle Eastern countries, Iraq’s public-sector accounts for a significant portion
of the economy (Bellin, 2004, p. 139). During the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a highly
centralized, command economy, controlled by the state. The nation still relies on oil revenue, a
major dividing factor amongst the three major ethnic factions, to sustain its economy. When
the Ba’ath party lost power, the Sunni minority was unable to maintain primary control over
the oil producing regions in the northern and the eastern parts of the country. The division of
oil revenue is a source of major contention between the once powerful Sunni minority, the
Kurdish-controlled oil rich northern areas, and the Shi’ia dominated parliament. During the
initial occupation phases of the Iraq war, the U.S. and coalition forces adhered to the “big
bang”3 approach for instituting neoliberal economic reforms, and by using this method the
coalition overlooked many unique challenges facing Iraq at the time: a post-authoritarian
government, a weak middle class, residually socialist institutions, and the forces of Islamic
fundamentalism.
Most historians agreed that for democracy to succeed in the country, Iraq had to maintain
political institutions that represented all Iraqis fairly and equally. After the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion, Iraq operated as an occupied government under the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). During this period, U.S. and coalition officials worked with Iraqis in developing a new
political system, which better represented minority factions, like the Kurds, Turkmen, and
Christians. Iraq’s constitution, approved in 2005, established a parliamentary democracy con-
sisting of three branches: judicial, executive, and legislative. The judicial branch is a consoli-
dated federal judiciary based on European civil and Islamic religious law. The executive branch
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consists of a chief-of-state (President), a head-of-government (Prime Minister), and a Council of
Ministers. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral council of representatives, of which
the majority faction selects the Prime Minister.
The major structural obstacle impeding Iraq’s political development was the historical ethnic
and sectarian divisions amongst the Arab Shi’ia in the south, the Kurdish populations in the
north, and the Sunni Arab populations in the center and west. Because the ethnic imbalance had
the propensity to ignite sectarian civil war, coalition policy makers urged the Iraqis to develop a
type of proportional representation. In theory, the ethnic divisions could have served as a check
against one another’s power. Instead, the fractious decision-making and majority-representation
created more alienation and resentment amongst the disparate parties.
During this period, disgruntled insurgent groups and former Ba’athists gained more ground
and became increasingly effective at targeting coalition forces. The radical Islamist, Abu Musa’b
al-Zarqawi is credited with integrating Salafist ideology into a cohesive fighting force to counter
the American and coalition presence. In 2004, his network pledged allegiance to the broader Al
Qaeda terrorist organization, and was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As such, by 2006,
American policy makers feared that if U.S. forces pulled out of the region too soon, the nascent
Iraqi government would be faced with overwhelming opposition from the insurgency and an
ethnic civil war (Ottaway, 2005). To counter AQI and radicalized elements of the Iraqi society,
U.S. and coalition forces stayed in the country much longer than they initially planned. The
conundrum for Iraq was that in order for the nation to gain security, Iraqi-led forces had to
generate enough control of their own territory, but without U.S. and coalition forces in the region
the nation would have quickly spiraled into civil chaos.
For macro-level political reasons, in 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s Sunnis realigned with U.S. forces
to battle AQI (Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014). Concurrent to the surge of
U.S. forces in the region and the U.S. military’s doctrinal change in late 2006, Sunni tribal
leaders in the western Anbar province of Iraq experienced a “Sahwa” or “Awakening” move-
ment, which led them to side with U.S. and coalition forces. Later, as more leaders joined the
movement, these “Sons of Iraq” were organized into a formal program and paid by the
U.S. forces to fight insurgent groups.
Explanations of the alliance that formed between U.S. forces and the tribal sheikhs of Anbar
province as well as the broader Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement in 2006 and 2007 are often attributed to
monetary factors, or relative personal gains. Several policy makers have argued that the reason the
Sunnis aligned with the U.S. is because the U.S. military paid them to do so (Public Radio
International, 2009).4 The Sunni Awakening (or Sahwa) movement was actually connected to a
much larger movement within Iraq at the time, fed by the Sunnis’ widespread discontent of the
central government as well as the rise in Al Qaeda’s criminal activities in their sectors and villages.
The central government could not keep pace with the spread of the criminal organizations and by late
2005, Al Qaeda had complete control over many Sunni areas, especially in west Baghdad and the
western provinces of Salahuddin, Tamim, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar.
The surge proved to be successful in the short run, yet was difficult for war planners to
distinguish which surge component—the military reinforcement or the doctrinal change—was
most effective in Iraq, primarily because there was such little variation in force employment
during this period (Biddle, et al., 2012). Military historian Stephen Biddle carefully noted, “the
modest scale of reinforcements in 2007 suggests that doctrine may actually have been the
decisive factor. Without observing independent variation in troop density and doctrine, however,
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it is impossible to make a definitive statement as to their relative causal impact” (Biddle, et al.,
2012, p. 39). Yet, a third factor, a massive Sunni political and military realignment, proved to be
another important (and at times overlooked) component in the success of the surge.
STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS
State-Level of Analysis Arguments
Much of the literature on why groups align or realign comes from the realist and neorealist school of
thought in International Relations. There are four major theoretical debates at the foundation of how
and why alliances form in the international system of state actors. The first can be found in the
balance of power theorists like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson (1993), Kenneth Waltz
(1979) and, most recently, John Mearsheimer (2001). Balance of power theory is one of the basic
pillars of the realist theory of international relations. Realists argue states balance against the rising
power since it creates a vital problem for their national security. Since states are living in an
anarchical self-help world, they should act in a way as to balance against rising state actors.
The second major theoretical debate behind alliance formation takes us one step beyond the
realist balance of power doctrine and considers security to be the foremost concern of policy makers.
This camp is often referred to as “neorealist.” The neorealist literature suggests that the distribution
of power in the international system provides the most convincing theoretical explanation for the
origin conflict (Waltz, 1979). The leader of this school of thought is Stephen Walt. In his seminal
work, The Origins of Alliances, Walt challenges the realist balance of power theory and questions
whether states will choose to balance or bandwagon against threats. He also examines how states
choose alliance partners. After a close examination alliance structures in the Middle East, Walt
argues that a “balance of threat” thesis provides a better grasp on alliance formation than variables of
ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration. Furthermore, Walt shows that factors such as
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions can be just as important
elements in alliance politics. Walt also claims that aggregate power (including population, individual
and military capabilities, technical prowess, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggregate
intentions) all affect the level of threat. Walt posits that balancing is more common than bandwagon-
ing, but weak states are more likely to bandwagon against rising power (Walt, 1987, 1997).
Randall Schweller (1994) argues that balancing and bandwagoning are not dichotomous
activities because the motivation for bandwagoning and the motivation for balancing is quite
different. He shows that bandwagoning is associated with change and balancing with maintaining
the status quo. He argues that status quo states have self-preservation in mind; therefore, their
behavior will tend to be balancing. On the other hand, revisionist states have a desire to change the
status quo, therefore may bandwagon, or accept forms of aggression. Mearsheimer (2001) asks
whether states systematically engage in aggression as their relative power increases, and what
determines whether great powers balance as opposed to bandwagoning, buck-passing, or appeas-
ing. Mearsheimer argues on the side of offensive realism, in that he suggests that in a world of
uncertainty and anarchy, leaders are likely to seek more power and enhance prospects for survival.
The third major theoretical approach has its roots in economics. Mancur Olson’s (1965) work,
The Logic of Collective Action, is an important underpinning in the academic field of social
movement theory, revolutions, and cases of collective state actions. In the same camp, Robert
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Keohane (1984) and Joseph Nye (2004) provide the foundation of neoliberal institutionalism.
Like the realists, neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the state as the central unit of analysis.
Neoliberals do not deny the anarchic nature of the international system, but instead, they focus
on game theory in the explaining state behavior. Game theorists seek to show, through the
employment of games, how rational actors behave under a set of circumstances.
The fourth major theoretical approach can be attributed to Glenn Snyder (1984, 2002) in
his work on alliance formation. Snyder synthesizes the neorealist, neoliberal, and historical
analysis into a general, multi-faceted theory of alliance formation. Snyder looks at several
factors: costs, benefits, systemic forces, non-systemic incentives, conflicting interests, and
the effects of bargaining. Snyder amalgamates these factors into a generalizable model
alliance formation.
Sub-State (Sub-National) Level of Analysis Arguments
There are two areas of scholarly literature that address how groups form and coalesce at the level
beneath the state (sub-state). The first area is an extension of the neorealist literature; it carries the
same assumptions as the neorealist literature with the exception of the level of analysis. Instead of the
level of analysis being at the state level, these authors look at inside the state (Christia, 2013; Posen,
1993; Wilcox, 2000). The second area that addresses how groups form at the sub-state level comes
from the comparative politics literature on coalition formation (Riker, 1962).
Neorealist Departures
Posen (1993) applies fundamentals of the realist tradition of international relations theory to
conditions at the sub-state level in his work on the security dilemma and ethnic conflict. He
addresses how the competition for power and security unfolds in states where the sovereign is
no longer in control. Posen concludes that realist international relations theories can help
explain and predict the “intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the
wreckage of empires” (Posen, 1993, p. 43). He also shows that the security dilemmas in
these situations make the risk of conflict quite high. Wilcox (2000) argues that coalitions
between warring factions in the Yugoslav civil wars, which had three distinct political factions,
are best explained through balance of power theory. Like Wilcox, Christia (2013) finds that at
the sub-state level of analysis, alliances manifest based on the distribution of relative power,
not identity factors such as race, language, or religion.
The second area below the state level of analysis comes from the comparative politics
literature on coalition formation. Much of the work in the field assesses political coalitions
using bargaining theory. This field developed around a theory of political coalitions: the
postulation that politicians are inclined to form coalitions that are just large enough to win,
but not any larger (Riker, 1962). This gives them the maximum payoff (winning an
election) for the minimum price (attracting votes), or a minimum winning coalition.
Other literature in this field assesses coalitions in terms of the circumstances and environ-
ment under which they form or combinations of both (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973;
Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Strom, Budge, & Laver, 1994; Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1988).
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The 19th century military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz famously described war as “a
continuation of politics by other means.” Despite the fact that politics and war are intertwined,
the authors of the comparative political theory on coalitions generally do not apply their theories
to political factions that were in a state of armed conflict; however, theories on minimum
winning coalitions yield some interesting hypotheses, which pertain to alliance formation at
the sub-state level when armed conflict is taking place.
Two-Level Games
Robert Putnam (1988) deviates from the state-centric literature in his theory of “two-level games”
whereby he shows how domestic politics and international relations are intertwined (Putnam, 1988,
pp. 427–460). He argues that when domestic decisions need to be made, policy makers will take the
concerns of domestic players into account and work to build coalitions. On the international level,
however, policy makers simply look for decisions that will benefit their state.
The notion of two-level games is important when discussing the U.S. intervention in Iraq.
From the standpoint of the U.S. policy maker, there were several important international-level
foreign policy decisions being made that impacted the outcome of the war, stabilization, and
reconstruction efforts. Those decisions took into account broad issues dealing with the region as
a whole, balance of power considerations, as well as economic and diplomatic ties with regional
partners. Concurrently, military commanders on the ground had to make tactical military
decisions on a daily basis. Ideally, those tactical decisions would have aligned with changing
U.S. foreign policy objectives. Empirical evidence suggests that commanders on the ground
were likely driven by the politics of more existential threats, like coalition building between
local Iraqi counterparts, not state-level concerns (Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014).
From the standpoint of the Iraqis, who have a multitude of political factions, there were
certainly international-level considerations as well as domestic level win-sets that did not
coincide. Furthermore, the literature also suggests that in order for there to be an international
agreement between both the U.S. and Iraq, the “win-sets” of both countries must overlap. In
2009, these win-sets overlapped to the point where the U.S. and Iraq could negotiate a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA), but it is possible that domestic-level considerations were ignored
when those decisions were being made. Furthermore, as time progressed, these win-sets chan-
ged, as did domestic and international considerations on each side.
AGENT-BASED ARGUMENTS
Agent-based arguments for how groups coalesce look at individual actions, versus environmental or
structural conditions. These arguments are based on the idea that people make choices based on what
others do, and in making those choices people affect others. The micro motives of individuals in war
are especially important when assessing the actions on non-state actors; however, this sort of analysis
is cumbersome and rarely performed in the academic literature. Paul Staniland (2010) looks at the
causes of insurgent cohesion and fragmentation in his dissertation on insurgent groups. His analysis
is at the micro-level; looking at individual actors within armed groups, their rivals, and motivations.
Likewise, in a 2011 study by RAND, 36 cases of reintegration in Afghanistan were studied and 71%
of the cases cited “grievance” as a key factor for deciding to switch sides (Jones, 2011).
6 MAYE
Identity
Another way of looking at how groups align is to look at identity considerations, such as
religion, race, or ethnicity, similar to the way many historians describe the demography of Iraq.
Posner (2004) assesses this theory when explaining the institutions and ethnic politics in Africa.
He looked at groups of ethnically homogenous people on either side of two artificially construed
colonial boundaries and shows that ethnicity helped explain differences in political alignment,
not national identity. This is a common argument when looking at politics in Iraq; it is naturally
assumed that factions will align based on religious or ethnic considerations, like Sunnis aligning
with other Sunnis, or Kurds aligning with other Kurds. To the contrary, Posner’s work does not
predict what will happen when there is a fracture within religious and ethnic groups or when
there are multiple competing groups vying to align for power.
Weberian Sociology
The German social scientist, Max Weber stressed the importance of charismatic leadership in his
analysis of power and legitimate authority (Weber, 1978). While charisma itself is difficult to
define, Weber notes that charismatic leadership is often found with Prophets, demagogues, war
heroes, and popular political leaders. Charismatic leaders often lead social movements by
performing heroic deeds through unconventional means. In the Middle East, charismatic leader-
ship is often found in religious and political leaders. During the 20th century, the Middle East
saw a succession of political leaders who were typically deemed to be a source of legitimate
authority after a coup d’état or social revolution. Samuel Huntington (1968) also emphasized the
importance of charismatic leadership in the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy or where
political institutions are very weak. Specifically, he notes, “[i]nstead of the party reflecting the
needs of the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party”
(Huntington, 1968, p. 91). Huntington defines institutionalization as “the process by which
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (p. 12). Furthermore, Huntington
suggests political institutions have “recurring patterns of behavior” and are strongest when
they are adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent (p.12).
COMBINING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
Micromotives and Macrobehavior
Schelling’s (1978) work Micromotives and Macrobehaviors assesses the aggregation of indivi-
dual micro-motives as an expression of societal macro-behavior. One of the key models that
Schelling uses is in the notion of “critical mass,” which is the point where a sufficient number of
individuals adopt a change in a social system so that change becomes self-sustaining. Schelling
also introduces the concept of feedback loops applied to social behavior.
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Complexity Theory and Self-Organizing Systems
Rooted in the study of non-linear dynamics, complexity theory in the social sciences looks at
how micro-systems and events can cause complex behaviors at the macro-level. Complexity
theories take into account both agency and structure as well as a multitude of variables
contributing to initial conditions, many of which do not act in a linear fashion. The theorists
postulate that these layers of interactions produce self-reinforcing feedback loops, many of
which depend on strong prior conditions. Complexity theory is characterized by nine basic
concepts: survivability, co-evolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-
organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium, and fitness landscapes (Axelrod, 1997; Axelrod &
Cohen, 1999; Kauffman, 1993; Lewin, 1992; Richards, 2000).
The complexity literature in the social sciences is a departure from neorealism on three major
fronts. First, non-state actors are important when looking at the evolution of the international
system (Jervis, 1997). Complexity models are important in the analysis of sub-state alignments
and alliances because there is a propensity for multiple layers of belligerents and actors (Jervis,
1997). Second, equilibrium is not as meaningful a concept. Whereas in the realist literature, the
concepts of balancing and bandwagoning to restore the balance of power are key strategies for
state survival; the literature on complexity theories looks at evolutions, dynamic systems, and
patterns of change. Third, the complexity literature takes into account both agency (in terms of
micro-motives) and structure (in terms of initial conditions). In terms of the perpetuation of
complex behavior and the reinforcement of specific actions taken by militant groups, various
scholars have introduced the concept of “violence markets” whereby actors are economically
incentivized to continue fighting regardless of what the conflict is doing to the “state” at large
(Elwert, 2015). The concept of a “violence market” combines both agent-based economic
incentives with structurally-based broad ideological and political goals.
CASE 1: ANBAR AWAKENING
In its beginning, the Sunni political and military realignment was largely tribal. From the onset,
Sunni tribal leaders viewed the Shiite-led Iraqi government with distrust, and by 2005, Anbar’s
tribal leaders were enduring years of social, religious, and economic conflict with AQI. AQI
leaders posed a direct threat to the traditional power of the sheikhs and openly challenged their
rulings in religious and social matters (Cigar, 2011). Sheikh Ali Hatim al-Suleiman, of the
3 million strong al-Dulaymi confederation, wanted to strike back on AQI in 2005, but realized
that such an effort would provoke an even stronger retaliatory response (Cigar, 2011). He also
realized that the tribal leaders needed American support to be effective, but openly cooperating
with the Americans would not garner popular support with the general Sunni population (Cigar,
2011). By mid-late 2005 the tribes were already in open warfare against Al Qaeda, but they did
not have support from the U.S. forces in the area (Montgomery, 2009).
In Anbar province, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha is often credited as the founder of the
Anbar Sahwa movement. Like al-Suleiman, Abu Risha was another prominent sheikh from the
al-Dulaymi tribe. For most of his life he had lived as an opportunist; during the strict economic
sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the Gulf War he was well known for smuggling oil and
conducting highway robberies along the vast stretch of desert highway that separates Iraq from
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Syria (D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, October 27, 2017). In 2006, he approached
U.S. Marine forces operating in Anbar province to build an alliance to fight AQI. His move
couldn’t have been more appropriately timed; the commander there, Lieutenant Colonel Sean
McFarland, was facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Earlier that year, the U.S.
Marine’s headquarters-level intelligence staff had concluded that, “there was little the
U.S. could do to stifle the insurgency in Anbar” (Gordon & Trainor 2012, p. 248).
Extraordinary measures would be needed in order to secure the area.
Abu Risha was the first tribal leader to encourage his followers to join the local police forces
in Anbar Province to fight against the insurgency. Other tribal leaders followed suit, and the
Sahwa spread throughout the province. Later, U.S. forces discovered the killing of his three
brothers and his father by AQI may have motivated Abu Risha to switch sides (Gordon &
Trainor, 2012, p. 251). As his movement grew, he founded a formal council for Sahwa matters,
including dozens of Sunni tribal leaders from his region. The collaborative pattern “spread
rapidly through the province” and thousands of young Sunni men joined the local police forces
(Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010, p. 59).
The Anbar Awakening was particularly successful because the Sunnis knew exactly where
the AQI fighters lived and how to target them (Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010, p. 59). The legitimacy
of Anbar’s tribal leaders was instrumental in the recruitment and retention of young Sunni men.
Because it was so successful, the Anbar Awakening became the model for exploiting the fissure
between Sunni insurgent groups and the general Sunni population (Office of the Special
Investigator for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). The integration and focus on tribal leaders was
also important, because they ended up providing the critical link between Sunni politicians in
Baghdad and former military officers working at the local level.
CASE 2: BAGHDAD AWAKENING
When then the commander of the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, then-
Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, arrived in western Baghdad in late 2006, he recalled there was
no rule of law, no municipal services, and violence was very high (Kuehl, personal commu-
nication, May 2, 2014).Over the next several months, the violence did not abate. By May 2007,
a succession of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks over the course of two weeks killed
over a dozen of Colonel Kuehl’s soldiers. Like Colonel McFarland had done in Anbar province,
Colonel Kuehl took extraordinary measures to redirect the momentum of the campaign.
One of the first leaders of the Awakening movement in Baghdad, Sa’ad Ghaffoori (aka Abu
Abed), had worked as an Iraqi Army intelligence officer under Saddam Hussein. By late 2006,
AQI was controlling the population in his upper-class neighborhood of Ameriyah in western
Baghdad through kidnapping, torture, and murder (Keuhl, 2009, p. 77). Tactically speaking,
Ameriyah was in an ideal position to hit Radwaniyah Palace Complex, the biggest coalition
base in Iraq, with Katyushas and other Soviet-era artillery pieces stolen by AQI fighters. After
the fall of Saddam Hussein, AQI fighters had vowed to protect Ameriyah’s residents from
Shi’ia militias and American soldiers. Without the rule of law, however, AQI grossly abused
their power and the residents of the neighborhood, which was deemed by many AQI opera-
tives as the capital of the Islamic State in Iraq. Abu Abed’s own brothers were tortured and
beheaded by Shi’ia militias because of the lack of security in the area.
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Encouraged by the success of the Anbar Awakening, and with the help of a local imam, in
May 2007 Abu Abed took charge of the Sahwa movement in Ameriyah. Over the course of the
next several months, Abu Abed worked with the U.S. military to gain control over the
neighborhood. The collaboration aided both sides: Abu Abed’s men gained military support
from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army gained critical intelligence. The new intelligence aided
operators in targeting AQI members and helped U.S. forces find their weapons caches (S.
Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016). Then the Awakening movement spreads
to other provinces. In 2007, former Ba’ath party members Baqubah aligned with U.S. forces
and provided intelligence on AQI strongholds in the city (Kagan, 2009, p. 118).
Sons of Iraq
The SOI’s intimate knowledge of the local population, insurgent strongholds, and access to
reliable intelligence facilitated the efficiency and success of the Sahwa movement. With the help
of U.S. forces and momentum gained from tactical successes, the Sahwa quickly spread to
Baghdad’s other sectors, including: Hayy Al-Jamia, Adhimiya, Dora, and Khadra. By early
2008, the SOI had grown to a force of over 100,000 (Ahmed, 2008). Many of the SOI leaders
were former Iraqi officers and soldiers under Saddam Hussein (S. Ghaffoori, personal commu-
nication, April 17, 2016). The men were familiar with formal military doctrine as well as
unconventional warfare, small arms, and guerilla tactics. Once the U.S. formalized the program,
SOI members were paid the equivalent of $300 USD per month for providing security services
(Bruno, 2009; S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016).
ALIGNMENT AND ALLIANCE FORMATION
The Awakening movement allowed the U.S. to take advantage of the internal cleavages amongst
the Sunni population, seize the momentum, and provide stability. The combination of the surge
in U.S. forces, Army doctrinal changes and the Sunni Awakening led to a decrease in violence
and a strategic pause which enabled the U.S. forces to negotiate a SOFA with the Iraqi
government and develop a plan to withdraw from the region. In addition, the decrease in
violence led to a gradual improvement in the ability of the Iraqi Army to control and hold
ground during operations.
In both the case of Abu Risha and Abu Abed, the individuals had a grievance. In the case of
Abu Risha, it was AQI’s lack of respect for tribal authority and the fact they murdered his family
members. In the case of Abu Abed, it was AQI’s indiscriminate use of violence and the lack of
security in his neighborhood. Both men sensed an opportunity for advancement, both in terms of
security for their area and in political opportunity (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April
17, 2016). Over time, this led to their individual realignment with U.S. forces. The next steps in
the realignment process were significant battlefield successes against AQI, leading to their rise
as popular figure. Only then did the realignment happen at a macro-level, across a sector of the
society. It is important to note that within that sector of society, many have the same grievances
as the popular figure. Once a macro-level alignment took place, U.S. forces were able to
institutionalize the SOI program. It is important to note that the bulk of the realignment process
in both cases was ideological. Most of the steps involved in the early phases were not economic
10 MAYE
in nature. Only when an ideological shift occurred, buffered by an opportunity for economic and
political security, did realignment take place.
The issue for host nation and coalition forces is that in order for the realigned factions to aid
in counterinsurgency, they must be able to self-organize and protect themselves, as well as their
communities. The realigned factions also had a leading figure, which convinced others to join
the cause. The problem is that self-organization by militant groups, especially those with a
leading figure, are perceived as a threat to the state and entrenched politicians. There was also a
problem with the legitimacy of the organization. While the U.S. and many Iraqi citizens
appreciated the efforts of the SOI, they were never truly seen as a legitimate organization.
Yet, in essence, it was the SOI that reflected the U.S.’s counterinsurgency doctrine of
population-centric, rapidly adapting, tactical-level resistance. The Sunni realignment in both
Anbar and Baghdad also demonstrates that the impetus to “change sides” often happens on a
personal level before it grows into an ideological movement. Likewise, the Sunni Awakening
shows that realignment is often initialized because of betrayal and opportunities for advance-
ment, and not necessarily by monetary gain. As the Awakening movements grew, it became a
way for former military members and jobless men to find meaningful employment
(Chakmakchi, personal communication, August 11, 2014). So, while initial recruitment was
ideologically driven, over time it became a security business (Chakmakchi, personal commu-
nication, August 11, 2014).
This analysis suggests that political factions will realign based on individual considerations that
then develop into macro-level movements. Thus, nor agent-based nor structure-based arguments
alone can explain the process by which the leaders switched sides. Thus, it is important to combine
both agency (in terms of micro-behaviors by political actors) and structure (in terms of initial
conditions) when assessing both the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings. An important concept
within the self-organization literature is the idea of “critical mass.” Theories of self-organization
suggest that individual considerations aggregate to a point of critical mass in order to become
macro-level movements. In the case of Iraq, there were individuals like Abu Abed and Sheikh Abu
Risha who decided as individuals to align with the Americans, but the macro-level Awakening
movement did not gain momentum until enough individuals had joined the SOI. Both Abu Abed
and Abu Risha were charismatic leaders, who propelled a wider social movement.
Yet, there is no consensus on whether or not a single personality can shape an entire
movement. Colonel Simon Gardiner, a now retired Army Civil Affairs Officer that served in
Iraq during the surge, points to the importance of personal leadership in countering insurgency
(Gardiner, personal communication, May 17, 2014). Equally important during the Sahwa was
the role of a leading figure, like Abu Risha or Abu Abed, who had charisma and leadership
capabilities, as well as the ability to convince others to “switch sides.”
On the other hand, then-Major General John Kelly, who was the Multi-National Force-West
commander during the height of the surge, states that “[n]o single personality was the key in
Anbar…[i]t was a combination of factors, not the least of which…was the consistent command
philosophy” (Kelly, 2009). It is important to understand that under the previous regime in Iraq
there was a cult of personality that promoted the adulation of Saddam Hussein. Likewise, a
leading figure in Arab politics often dominates, which is common in authoritarian governance
(Sassoon, 2011, p. 175). So, it is not surprising, from a cultural standpoint, that the actions of
one person would be celebrated by elements of the Iraqi populace.
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The importance of charismatic leadership as a source of legitimate authority was seen during the
Sunni Awakening, but perhaps underappreciated by coalition forces, which were more accustomed
to legal-rational and traditional sources of authority. In the aforementioned cases, the U.S. didn’t
approach Abu Risha or Abu Abed with the notion of realignment or switching sides. To the contrary,
the U.S. military’s role came later; the military was needed to gain them battlefield success, which in
turn gave them more legitimacy and more popular support. The rapid rise of Abu Abed as a
charismatic leader is especially important, as his power rested on his image of being able to perform
heroic deeds, often by what were seen as irrational or untraditional means. So, the critical point in
realignment for the U.S. military is not in the institutionalization of security programs, but the point
between an individual’s realignment and the perception of their battlefield successes.
Therefore, it is logical to conclude that in their formative stages, political factions typically
behave in accordance with agent-based considerations. As the political groups mature, they
typically follow a charismatic leader to the point of institutionalization. Once political groups
mature to the point of institutionalization they are more likely to behave in accordance with
structural theories from the neorealist literature. This suggests that alignment and alliance building
is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity. When the
political party or militant group is not institutionally mature, it will rely more upon charismatic
leadership or agent-level motivations. Once the group has matured, it will behave more in
accordance with the neorealist literature and less on the authority of the charismatic leader.
NOTES
1. See also: (Booth, 1987; Liska, 1962; Snyder, 1997; Walt, 1995; Wilkins, 2012).
2. See also: (Bengio, 1998; Lewis, 1995; Tripp, 2007; Yitzhak, 1995).
3. The ‘big bang’ approach to economic reform suggests market-oriented reforms should be implemented before
entrenched politicians can block them. See: (Islam, 2006).
4. For additional background on how the Army uses money as a weapon system see: Center for Army Lessons
Learned, “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapon System” April 2009 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/
09-27/09-27.pdf; (Petraeus, 2008).
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